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TS # 173148

USIB-D-28.5/2

2 March 1962

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UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

SUBJECT : Reports Regarding Recommendations on
Certain Intelligence Functions

REFERENCES: (a) USIB-D-28.5/1, 12 February (SC # 02296)
(b) USIB-D-29.1/6, 13 February (TS # 173141)
(c) USIB-M-200, 14 February 1962, item 6

1. The attached memoranda from General Fitch, which we are forwarding for review, are responsive to a Board action of 14 February (USIB-M-200, item 6) and report on the review by his committee of (a) the recommendations of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board regarding "Advance Intelligence Pertaining to the Berlin Wall and Syrian Coup Incidents" (USIB-D-28.5/1, 12 February, SC # 02296), and (b) Mr. Coyne's memorandum concerning "The Watch Committee--National Indications Center" (USIB-D-29.1/6, 13 February, TS # 173141).

2. As you will recall, the Board agreed at the 28 February meeting that it would be desirable to request an extension of the 12 March target date for reply to the White House on the recommendation of the President's Board, so that General Fitch and the members of his committee (Mr. Hilsman and Mr. Traynor) could be present for Board discussion of the report. We have been advised by Mr. Amory that appropriate approval has been obtained for an extension in Mr. Bundy's original target date.

3. We presently plan, therefore, to place these reports on the agenda of the USIB meeting scheduled for 21 March, for Board consideration and action, including on the proposed responses to the White House and Mr. Coyne.

Harry J. Thompson
HARRY J. THOMPSON
Lt. Colonel, USAF
Acting Executive Secretary

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HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Office of Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence

TS # 173148
26 February 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR : Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : Review of Advance Intelligence Pertaining
to the Berlin Wall and the Syrian Coup
Incidents (TS)

1. In accordance with your instructions, Mr. Roger Hilsman, Mr. Harry S. Traynor, and I submit herewith a proposed reply to the President that responds to the four recommendations contained in the report, above subject, by the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. Although we do not concur in many of the arguments contained in this report, we have refrained from comment thereon and have addressed ourselves exclusively to the recommendations as required by Mr. Bundy. We believe it possible to provide a more timely appraisal and forwarding of certain cold war crises situations and we believe a more complete distribution of certain intelligence reports and operational information to the USIB principals is indicated.

2. To correct these apparent deficiencies, we propose that the terms of reference provided the Cold War Crisis Group of the Office of National Estimates be formally broadened to direct the efforts of that group to cover all potential cold war crises situations of interest to our national planners. We propose the necessary augmentation of that group to permit them to consider these situations on a continuing basis and to provide to the President's advisers interim appraisals of those situations when the urgency will not permit their being held for inclusion in the Weekly Cold War Crisis Situation Report.

3. We also recommend the revision of NSC 5438 dated 3 November 1954. As presently written, this paper directs the provision of all intelligence and operational information bearing on the function of the Watch Committee to be provided that committee for their exclusive use in that function. It is recommended that the revision provide that all intelligence reports and operational plans or messages that might have a bearing on cold war crises situations or might stimulate adverse reaction by any nation be provided members of USIB for their exclusive use in considering cold war crises situations.

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4. We believe that these corrective actions will permit a more effective and timely support of high level planners in the cold war and should go a long way to correcting the situation pointed up by the referenced study.

(Signed)
ALVA R. FITCH
Major General, GS
ACofS for Intelligence

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Memo for Pres
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the Chiefs of Missions in foreign countries now submit periodic appraisals of conditions in their areas of responsibility. The WEEKA, prepared by the Country Team, reports on and analyzes significant events that have not been previously reported during the week. There are other less frequent and more specialized periodic appraisals by each station. When a crisis situation develops or is foreseen the Country Team appraisal of available intelligence is normally made spontaneously and is kept current by further initiative reporting. These appraisals are important in that they provide the judgment of the men on the ground. In this connection I plan to discuss with the Secretary of State the feasibility of including in the WEEKA a section devoted to the cold war crises situations, without in any way delaying the reporting on such situations.

With reference to Recommendation No. 3 that intelligence publications reflect differences of opinion, I agree that there should be opportunity for dissent by members of the United States Intelligence Board and their representatives on the Board's subordinate committees in reporting their deliberations and conclusions to the policy makers. In fact, upon assuming my responsibility as Chairman of the United States Intelligence Board I reiterated both the importance I attach to the use of footnotes to present

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divergent views and my desire that estimates not be watered down to get everyone aboard. The members of USIB unanimously concurred in this. I should point out, however, that judgment and restraint in the expression of dissent is important. Overindulgence in the practice of submitting divergent views could result in the policy makers having to arrive at their own interpretation without having time to consider all of the detailed information available.

Within the Watch Committee the practice is to insure that the conclusions themselves are concise and positive reflections of the world situation with regard to Sino Soviet intentions and of developments relating to hostile action. However, should there be a disagreement with the conclusions, a footnote may be included. Divergent views of the committee are generally included, not as footnotes to the conclusions, but as alternate possibilities within the body of the report of the Watch Committee. This practice is used to some degree in National Intelligence Estimates, Special National Intelligence Estimates, and the Cold War Crisis Report.

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With reference to Recommendation No. 4 that CIA spot reports be made available, this is only part of the larger problem of assuring adequate dissemination of intelligence and political, military, and diplomatic plans. While I think existing arrangements for reporting foreign intelligence to the President and to the members of his staff are sufficiently comprehensive and flexible to permit adequate reporting of crises situations, I look forward to discussions with appropriate White House officials regarding possible improvement in our service to the President and the National Security Council.

I propose to improve the responsiveness of the intelligence community to possible cold war crises situations by broadening and clarifying the terms of reference of the cold war working group of the Board of National Estimates. The present charter of the group was forwarded to your office in a memorandum by the Director of Central Intelligence on 21 August 1961. I consider this mechanism an appropriate means to perform this estimative function since I consider it unwise to broaden the responsibilities of the Watch Committee at the expense of that committee's ability to concentrate on its important mission of providing warning of hostile action or of impending developments that could eventuate in hostile action by the Sino Soviet Bloc.

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In 1954 the National Security Council in NSC 5438 directed the provision to the Watch Committee of all intelligence and intelligence information having a bearing on its functions. It also specified that information concerning significant diplomatic, political, military or other courses of action by the United States, approved for immediate implementation or in the process of execution, which might bring about military reaction or early hostile action by the USSR or its allies, be provided for the explicit and express use of the Watch Committee. I consider that this directive should be broadened to provide corresponding intelligence and political, military, and diplomatic plans or actions that might have a bearing on cold war crises situations to all members of the United States Intelligence Board to assist that Board in assessing possible reactions adverse to United States' interest. I believe this will contribute substantially to our ability to alert the President and the National Security Council to potential crises, as such crises are often stimulated or brought about as a direct or indirect result of U. S. actions, pronouncements, or positions taken in international bodies.

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I believe the augmented effort and broadened terms of reference for the Cold War Crisis Group of the National Board of Estimates, coupled with increased dissemination of intelligence and advance information of planned diplomatic, political, and military moves to the members of the Intelligence Board will enable the intelligence community to improve materially its ability to overcome the problems brought out by our study of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board Report.

JOHN A. McCONE
Director of Central Intelligence

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